Assessing The Damage In Iran

Post-election ‘tidying up’ continues throughout Iran as the regime reasserts its hold on power slowly but surely. It seems that many important networks hedged their bets until they could see which the wind was blowing.

The influential Society of Scholars of Qom Seminary waited until this weekend to remove its doubts and to throw itself behind the President with a message of congratulations. This is interpreted as clerical determination to place the survival of the Islamic republic above any other consideration.

However, the Financial Times also reports that the reformist Association of Scholars and Researchers of Qom Seminary, representing a minority of clerics, took a different view, questioning the legitimacy of the election.

This story seems to tell us that the regime may be secure but that the ‘reformists’ are beginning to coalesce around a narrative that is not necessarily revolutionary but that is almost certainly determined on change. It may yet come to power in a few years through constitutional means.

We also note the claims (still unconfirmed) that the Iranians plan to put on trial a local British Embassy staff member for allegedly helping to instigate the recent protests. This is the only one of the original nine arrested who is still in custody.

The Iranian authorities also released a Greek journalist: his arrest was for the rather mild matter of exceeding the duration of his visa. With the analyst far from certain to face charges, it is a question whether Western hysteria or Islamic villainy offers the best explanation of recent events.

We detect a sort of sub-racist attitude to Islamic justice based largely on some particularly nasty anti-homosexual and other communal incidents in the backwoods.

This is probably like condemning the US Constitution on the basis of lynching in the Deep South but liberals are determined to label this regime as only one step down from that of the Nazi Party.

Even if Western worries about an Iranian ‘white terror’ have clearly been overdone, the EU, at British request, was placing maximum but ratcheted pressure on Iran, starting with a summoning of Iranian Ambassadors and warnings of tougher measures, including visa restrictions.

However, it is equally clear that there was no stomach in Europe for a few possibly slightly naughty diplomatic auxiliaries to be allowed to derail a dialogue with Iran. The sentiment is likely to be similar amongst high officials in Tehran.

The problem here is that the conspiracy theory about Western interference is like the counter-conspiracy theory of vote-rigging. Both rely on suggestive circumstantial evidence. Neither side has full access to the facts available within the other side’s system.

In a sense, the West started this tit-for-tat in hysteria by shifting from criticism of the handling of protests in the direction of full acceptance of protestors' claims about the implied legitimacy of the regime.

Tehran now has every incentive and perhaps some need to create a show trial in which it can present its case, based on its intelligence data, for Western, specifically British, dabbling in its internal affairs.

From there, it can track back into the Iranians complicit with a plot which they may yet be able to prove (not necessarily as official at all) regardless of the protests of the FCO whose impotence is now out there for all to see.

The targeted individual is a ‘respected political analyst’ who could face a long jail sentence and it does point up the ambiguity when a local analyst offers advice to officials of a foreign power but the whole business does seem to have been over-egged by all sides.

Meanwhile, the Israelis continue to stir the pot with claims that Mossad has advised that, as a result of ‘secret’ talks with Saudi officials, the Kingdom would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over its territory. The Saudis deny talks but Israel is clearly placing a direct attack on Iran back on the agenda.

There is much at stake. The question is not whether the arrested individual is released but whether the release is political despite any British involvement in Iran’s internal affairs in order to keep dialogue with the West on track.

And if the matter goes to trial, the issue becomes whether the trial is fair and fairly reported despite FCO determination to protect its own. This may all be sorted out diplomatically but the underlying questions surrounding the nature of British direct or indirect support for the reform movement remain unanswered.

The Israeli-Saudi reference is important in this context. Decision-making within Iran is taking place under the same perceived atmosphere of external threat that fuelled the turn to terror after the French and Russian revolutions. 

It will take some restraint on the part of the Iranian regime not to be provoked into unnecessarily draconian measures. If the UK and the EU are trying to calm things, the Israelis are clearly trying to fuel paranoia for reasons that are malign and dangerous both to peace and the reform movement.

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Opaque Happenings In Tehran

The Iranian revolt is falling into four broad story lines: what is actually happening on the street; the mobilisation locally and internationally of the reformers; the politics within the ruling elite; and international, largely Western, reactions (which we hope to deal with on another occasion).

Bringing Us Up To Date

Media analysis of Iranian internal affairs is highly speculative because of the limited access to events for the Western media. Pressure on foreign journalists has intensified greatly. The situation, from a Western perspective, is confused and opaque.

Anything might now happen – from swift resolution to civil war. We do note, however, that international interest in the revolt is beginning to drift a little and that the Iranian authorities are finally mounting a credible and co-ordinated propaganda fight-back of their own.

We note the riots, with ten officially notified as dead alongside the usual injuries and beatings. We note the rooftop protests and even talk by Moussavi of ‘martyrdom’ in Tehran but the very fact of bloody battles with the police tends to indicate that the street fight is going the regime’s way.

The point here is that the police have not refused to act alongside the Basij and there has not been a smidgeon of rumour as yet about military dissatisfaction. The authorities have now slipped into extreme ‘Cheney-speak’ by referring to the demonstrators as ‘terrorists’.

Nevertheless, the graphic death of a young woman created a major propaganda opportunity for reformists that was used globally to sustain outrage and support. The demonstrations are now spreading, on a small scale, to centres outside Iran wherever Iranian expatriates can be found.

Where Next?

Reformers are placing their trust (it seems) on the hope that the Revolutionary Guards (whom they believe are split and have factions supportive of Rafsanjani) will refuse to ‘fire on the crowd’.

But few believe that this will be a battle won for reformers in the streets - a few martyrs may be necessary but the issue will be decided within the ruling elite. Street fighting is merely the means to get a split in the ruling order. The State has too many instruments at its command otherwise.

Much of the ‘analysis’ (such as it is) therefore attempts to paint an implicit scenario in which pro-reform or exasperated elements within the ruling elite mount a coup against the Supreme Leader because the Supreme Leader has now backed Ahmedinejad unequivocally.

From this perspective, Khamenei may be regarded as fully complicit in the President's economic policies (the real concern of many of the potential ‘plotters’). Of course, we do not know (neither does anyone outside the persons involved) what precisely is going on at the opaque centre of things.

However, our working hypothesis is that a) the reformists are much weaker in the street than the West would like to believe and that b) to keep the street going some elite reformists are having to move into dangerous territory as they question the integrity of the regime.

The Need To Act Fast?

The stakes on the critical propaganda issue have been raised. The reformers are throwing all their cards on a claim that the election was not a matter of a bit of vote-rigging in the provinces but was pre-rigged at a national level months in advance.

If so, this plot must now be assumed to include the incumbent President and a naïve or complicit Supreme Leader. These are very grave charges which cut directly at the intelligence, integrity and honour of a religious leader. Will this now be interpreted as a direct challenge (by some) towards God?

This must raise severe doubts, amongst any ‘moderates’ who are not determined on the fall of the regime, about the consequences of going further. And of not going further at all ... reform elements within the ruling elite must be fearful that revolution could go badly for them if it is not carried through.

The arrest of four relatives of Rafsanjani at the weekend (although subsequently released) indicates just how close this crisis is impinging on key individuals.

The talk coming out of the reform movement is of a push to create a unified opposition front under the leadership of Moussavi. The end-game is pretty obvious now. If the official organs of the State can be made to turn on the 'unofficial' revolutionary movements, victory would then go to the coup leaders.

The Basis For A Coup

A coup by Rafsanjani could make him Supreme Leader backed by a President Moussavi with a large urban middle class and reform electoral base. The point is that such a coup, if pulled off constitutionally, would cause the police and the military to answer to legitimate authority.

This has to happen fast for two reasons:

• the ‘conservative’ camp is well aware of what has been going on and must be considering how it might constitutionally remove the plotters (as they see them). It shows weakness that they have not been able to act decisively in recent days.
• Moussavi, essentially an establishment figure, is being driven on to increasingly radical ground by the street. There must be a point of no return at which the plotters cannot hold the line against demands that they do not want to concede.

If a coup succeeds, the Basij and the Pasdarans may prove much flakier than the West has feared and, in effect, disband. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are not quite as disciplined or ideologically-driven as many think.

However, the longer the time it takes to seize power, the more opportunity there is for spines to be stiffened from the top and for the Islamic revolutionary element to mount a counter-coup. This cannot end well for some.

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After Khamenei's speech ...

We write only a short time after Khamenei’s speech in which, in essence, he stood up to the reformers by asking how 11 million Iranians could have had their votes rigged. He demanded that the protests be stopped and that the democratic will be respected.

He went beyond the expected call for calm and unity towards impatience with disruption that he saw as increasingly unjustified and malign in intent. He probably has a point on the scale of the vote-rigging. We sense that it has now become time for the reformists to put up or shut up on a revolution.

Rafsanjani

Until this point, the Western media have been somewhat seduced by protests that they have helped to fuel but a reaction is quietly setting in as questions start to be raised about the degree to which the reformists represent more than educated middle class Iran.

This question remains open but yesterday’s ‘black’ protests are likely to be the final peaceful stunt if Khamenei’s words result in a forcible crackdown on activities that the authorities increasingly see as counter-revolutionary and inspired from overseas.

Moussavi, apparently an old rival of Khamenei’s, is now in so deep that it is hard to see how he can escape the serious consequences of failure, driving him ever further forward. There have been protests in Isfahan and Tabriz.

However, early protests in presumably conservative areas, such as Rasht and Mashhad, are either diminishing under riot police scrutiny or have simply not taken root. The protests appear to be largely, though by no means exclusively, student and middle class where they are taking place at all.

The greatest speculation surrounds Rafsanjani – what is he up to? Has he got ‘frit’ and decided not to tempt fate by organizing that split in the ruling order that might pull in Larijani and remove not only Ahmedinejad but Khamenei himself (or turn him into a political cipher)?

Or will he emerge in the coming hours to spin Moussavi into power - or face arrest and Lord knows what else? In this opaque and conspiratorial atmosphere, Ahmedinejad’s open accusation that Rafsanjani is the puppet master in this crisis needs to be remembered.

The establishment has got the measure of the man – his two children have been barred from leaving the country which is what you do when you want to exert pressure over a critic or discourage him from scuttling off to form a Government-in-exile.

The assumption has always been that he is ‘plotting’ to build elite support for Moussavi (he is unpopular in the country) and to deliver power by opening the castle gates. The actual facts are unknown but the rumour in itself must be dangerous after Khamenei’s speech today.

Loss Of Momentum?

Is momentum being lost? It is too early to say but it does seem that this is not a national revolution in the sense of revolt by all classes and all regions. The establishment has its strongholds in both a class and regional sense.

Khamenei’s robust speech will have been designed to reassure these strongholds in holding the line against a counter-revolution (from an Islamist perspective) and perhaps to put the Basij and Pasdarans on notice to await instructions.

We are more convinced than ever, observing the election from outside, that we are getting a skewed vision of local conditions from media who love a revolution but who see it through the excited eyes of the participants.

This is not a small Eastern European country with one capital city around which the country revolves but a large and well populated state with several centres, more like the UK, Germany, Italy or modern France. Tehran cannot quite dictate national policy in a true crisis any more than London or Paris.

Similarly, the Islamic Republic is oppressive if you are middle class but its structures, like those of pre-sclerotic communism and national socialism or even fascism, provide definite advantages for many sections of the population.

So long as the economy is working within certain bounds (the West has been trying to break those bounds for some time through sanctions), the regime can remain relatively popular – as evidence shows that Stalin’s Russia or pre-war Nazi Germany were popular regardless of ‘oppressions’.

This may be a distasteful fact for liberals to accept but people have to decide sometimes whether they are liberals first or democrats first. It still remains very possible that Khamenei is telling the truth and that no substantive vote-rigging took place, at least not enough to affect the will of the people.

A ‘coup’ on the reformist side depends on humiliating the other side with proof of some vote-rigging, creating momentum for change and then re-running the vote on terms that ensure that natural conservatives switch votes to the coming regime. It is this strategy that is running into the sands.

Vote-Rigging?

We have to remember all this while the flood of romantic and youthful commentary pours in from the blogs – some of it is Wordsworth all over again, looking on that dawn when it was bliss to be alive.

The poet had little consciousness of the forces underpinning a revolution that led to terror and thence to Napoleon. Many a young proletarian communist might have reconsidered matters if he had been able to see into the future and be faced with the reality of famine in the Ukraine and Stalin.

Again, we must insist that we do not know whether the votes were rigged or not – but nor do many analysts who claim otherwise, based largely on theory. For example, a key argument is that 84% turnout means that a reformist would have been strongly favoured because of past trends.

Yet shocks in politics are normal – the 1997 landslide for New Labour was predicted by no-one at the time and history is full of surprises and trend reversals.

Another argument (as put by the Financial Times) is that ‘analysts and diplomats find it hard to believe’ that the dire economic status of the middle class could allow Ahmedinejad to capture so many votes.

Apart from the fact that analysts and diplomats are often notoriously wrong, no country at Iran’s level of development can be regarded as electorally dominated by the ‘middle class’. There is never one middle class in any country but many with, in Iran’s case, differing experiences of Ahmedinejad’s rule.

The media are really left with nothing but suspicions fuelled by radicals, political analysts and diplomats sympathetic (as we are in many ways) to the aspirations of the reformists.

Our own suspicion is that genuine voting irregularities in the provinces have been mixed up with rumour and unsubstantiated allegation to suggest a massive state operation to deprive Moussavi of the prize.

What is far more likely than some massive state plot is some over-enthusiastic, unauthorised and wrongful behavior that needs investigation but was not enough to cover the 11m vote difference.

Have We All Got It Wrong?

The question here is whether political scientists’ pre-election calculations and assumptions are to be wholly relied upon or whether it is possible that this election was ‘sui generis’ because of external factors.

Western policy over the last few years, may even be the factor that has made things turn out differently from expectation.

Could it not be possible (no more) that the treatment accorded to Ahmedinejad as pariah, sanctions and the constant belittling of the country’s aspirations from overseas might actually have mobilised voters to turn out and cock a snook at the West?

Or that the success of the reformists in genuinely mobilizing middle class opinion might also have mobilised those with something to lose from a change in the regime. We do not know but it is possible. And, if so, Western policy constructed under Bush-Blair could look asinine in retrospect …

Iran has degenerated into two camps with the same fixed conspiratorial approach, two sides of the same coin, where suggestive evidence of Western interference on the one side matches that of vote-rigging on the other. It is reasonable to suppose some truth in all the allegations.

The reformist movement is probably a genuine expression of the aspirations of a very substantial minority of Iranian society but that does not necessarily mean that Ahmedinejad was not the popular choice at the end of the day.

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