As It Happens is a current commentary on international relations and developments in British politics.  It also carries updates on the TPPR Group of companies and associates.  Clients can access  bespoke advice on political, cultural and ideological developments relevant to their specific interests in the form of regular reports, private briefings or research projects. 

Entries in Nationalism (2)

Tuesday
Nov172009

British Foreign Policy - 2010

The Prime Minister's foreign policy speech at the Mansion House on 16 November did not stir the nation. Foreign policy, unless it relates to the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, is now far less interesting than a domestic struggle for power that may lead to a new Government in the first half of 2010.

Like all electorates in all democracies when there is no enemy physically in sight, bread-and-butter issues and point-scoring dominate the agenda. Lobby group after lobby group throws its hat in the ring to draw attention to some crisis in governance whose reform, it hopes, will enter into the manifestos.

Foreign Policy Under Gordon Brown

But Brown's speech is worth noting because, like all Prime Ministerial Speeches, it represents not only a set of political choices but the preferences of a bureaucratic State that will carry them into its own dialogue with a new political administration.

Foreign policy tends to show more continuity than change between administrations than do other areas of policy. The political component of the Speech is also the position of the dominant faction within New Labour and, if defeated, it may become contested when Gordon Brown is required to resign.

So what makes Brown distinctive and how will the Tories respond to his legacy if they are in Government next year?

The first point to make is that the UK under New Labour remains truly internationalist and Atlanticist in orientation. The top issues for Brown are economic recovery, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and the Atlantic alliance against 'global terrorism'. All require international, specifically US, co-operation.

The idea of a 'shared vision' and of global institutions into which the 'world' (meaning the Western-led world) sinks its sovereignties is non-negotiable. It still remains unclear just how much the Conservative Party will drift back into a more nationalist stance if it is in power. Not as much as some think.

The Progressive Component

With an eye to his own crumbling political base, the Prime Minister spoke of 'great social movements' for 'common action'. This is the internationalism of the Left attempting to capture the soft end of the developmentalist and environmentalist movements against both radicalism and nationalism.

In this he is consistent with the general thrust of progressive thought since the ideology of the Labour Party was reformulated along post-Marxist lines in the mid-1990s. He is attempting to appeal to a post-imperial concern with 'making amends' and creating a better world.

The idealistic quasi-religious aspects of this ideology should not underestimated. All the passion that once went into Marxism has been diverted over two decades into a new global egalitarian model in which belief is as important as fact.

This is obviously so with climate change where the numbers who actually understand the science of climate change (we do not) are miniscule compared to those engaged with it as a policy issue at the very highest level. It is not a national interest but an international moral issue for the New Labour Left.

New Labour foreign policy is a hybrid of idealism and of Western, but not necessarily national, self interest where the capture of the West's military and ideological power as a progressive force in international affairs is central to the project.

The US Dimension

Brown's speech might be compared with Obama's interventions in China today where we have a similar programme adapted to American needs - economic recovery (in this case, more assertively related to trade imbalances), climate change and non-proliferation.

The differences are only that the British Prime Minister is still stuck on the war on terror groove because the UK is stuck in West Asia, while the US President had to appeal to his liberal internationalists at home with talk of human rights and Tibet in defiance of the nationalism bubbling in China's streets.

The US and UK are thus almost precisely on message with each other. The junior status of the UK in the Atlantic system might be taken as read but this raises another conundrum for analysts of a possible Tory Government - to what extent will it or can it break free of the US' own progressive agenda?

Given the fact that (as Peter Oborne's documentary noted) the Israeli lobby is shifting funds into the Tory Party, that the Tory Party is not only Atlanticist but has its own neo-conservative wing and that Cameron has already sold the pass on euro-sceptic nationalism, continuity seems likely.

Cameron is also committed to economic recovery (though his methods will be different and perhaps more amenable to the US), to climate change and to non-proliferation. His position on Afghanistan is not withdrawal (as most British people want) but better equipment!

Although the Conservatives will not have the progressive crusading zeal or rhetoric of New Labour and may be waiting out Obama for a more rightist Republican Administration, there is little sign that a vote for the Tory Party will fundamentally change the post-imperial alignment of British foreign policy.

An Excess Of Optimism

Push aside all the rhetoric and there is a policy issue unaddressed by either Party. Brown is an optimist that multilateral engagement can deal with global problems. All progressives have to be optimists. But there is another point of view unrepresented outside the nationalist right and europhile centre.

This is that the UK is taking on far too much. The programme of action proposed by the 'Establishment' (if we can call the broadly unified internationalist stance of both main parties by that name) is massive and far beyond the future ability of the British State to finance or to organise.

Multilateralism is, in this context, not an option but a necessity. The British State is brokering its historic leading position as nuclear power and voting member of the Security Council in a race against time for the day when it must inevitably drift into the second rank of powers.

Whether finally integrated into the US-led West or into the German-led EU or some preferred hybrid, by the time that China, Brazil, Russia and India find their post-recovery feet, the UK will be a province in the world system - Greece to some Rome, if only in its own estimation.

If you have a global vision (as Blair, Brown, Miliband and the Kinnocks have), the current Government represents the one shot at the future that British liberal internationalists must take and leave as a legacy to the centre-left of the wider European Union.

It is a self-consciously Gramscian pitch at ideological hegemony over a system that others will soon control in full. It is the reason for the recent fuss over Blair and Miliband's role in Europe. Although interpreted as rats leaving the sinking ship, they were only looking for a higher command.

But is this in the British national interest or is it a pitch to do universal good from ideologues that is being offered at the expense of the people who actually live within the United Kingdom?

The Nationalist Riposte & The City of London

The Conservative version of events, which may contribute to their victory, is that current general policy lines are appropriate but must be handled not from an idealistic perspective but from a pragmatic and realistic perspective. This means, of course, from the perspective of the economic dominance of the City.

This is not so different from New Labour, merely a shift of emphasis. New Labour has been committed to London as global City because it is the cash-cow for redistribution. The Tories are merely committed to it as a source of national wealth and power in its own right.

But the growing dissident perspective, fuelling libertarian, fascist and nationalist protest on the Right and liberal and even neo-Marxist protest on the Left, is that this is just not good enough.

The problem here is the very fact of globalisation and the sense that it may be producing diminishing returns and destabilising the nation. London has one third of its population born outside the UK and its economy increasingly dominates a national hinterland that has become drug-dependent on it.

It is like a hamster's treadmill - London works harder and harder to supply funds for a growing class of persons who may be unemployable, a rather meaty public sector employing 6 million people and the aspirations of a State that is expending geld in foreign policy adventures to assert its right to lead.

Meanwhile, this economic system draws in migrants who, bluntly, are degrading the old social democratic welfare system, demand (and are given) equal rights that diminish the opportunities of the weakest members of the indigenous community and build voting blocs for the new establishment.

Add to this that foreign policy (the Israel lobby is not the only one in play) is being guided by special voting blocs within urban areas, then 'ressentiment' is to be expected.

What Happens If The City Falters

But what happens when the City of London falters (as it has done recently). Current plans are predicated on the City recovering. The whole cycle then starts agaim. Yet there must be a limit to London being more innovative than clever Chinese bankers or to the physical number of migrants.

The Liberal Democrat solution is the effective transfer of sovereignty to a European Super-State that can handle the problems of faltering bits of itself. The experience of Iceland has badly shaken a lot of 'small nation' proponents and made the EU a more credible fall-back.

The nationalists of the Left and Right (not necessarily racist by any means) and possibly some Greens increasingly tend either to a fantasy of England (in particular) as some giant sovereign Singapore (which still does not deal with the problem of the City's dominance over the wider economy) or as autarky.

Autarky, not a serious proposition in its pure form given national food and energy dependency let alone the UK's intense integration into the global financial system, means less people with even less goods and services. Social cohesion could fall to post-Yugoslavian levels.

Does the UK push for an honoured position as global leader in order to secure the City's (and various innovative industries') pre-eminence, for as many economic cycles as the system will bear, or does it prepare for a City crash that has no recovery. The sensible approach would be to do a little of both.

This would suggest an international role that is centred on good trading relations with old and new centres of capital (where the Tories might be more realistic than New Labour) but build in a dynamic plan for infrastructural investment and social management to ensure national survival as conditions change.

In this last respect, New Labour seems to be offering us such a plan with its johnny-come-lately strategy of investment in nuclear power (supported by the Tories), gas reserves, transport, education and digital networks but it is doing so just as the country is facing the most serious fiscal crisis since the 1930s.

The Post-Imperial Crisis

We have to look back to the 1930s to get some context for what is happening and what is at stake. The UK's crisis then was primarily one of trade depression but it was not helped by the fact that the British Empire, in terms of costs to the taxpayer, was a net cost.

This was masked by the Second World War where national mobilisation created a temporary socialist economy. But war and empire are very expensive to run. The assets of Britain were effectively handed over to the de facto control of our US ally under a neo-colonial arrangement embedded by the 1960s.

The Suez crisis had proved that we could no longer stand alone and the Conservative Government unravelled the Empire (South Asia already having been disposed of) to the point where it had ceased to exist barring a few outposts and a troubled corner of Ireland by the 1970s.

The reconstruction of the British economy on the back of globalisation was a major achievement, based on a gamble, but it has created an air of hubris within the Establishment, epitomised by the return South of the Sahara and East of Suez of the former Prime Minister.

The current economic crisis is probably far more critical to the UK than anyone has yet realised. There is no dividend to be had from unravelling an empire or from unleashing entrepreneurial creativity. There is total dependence on a recovery in the global economy over which the British have little practical say.

The recovery will come but it is almost certainly going to be insufficient to deal with the pent-up demands for welfare in an over-populated country with a growing under-class (now represented by its own reactionary political party) facing off the liberal wealthy and urban minority groups.

The 'race against time' approach of New Labour may now be too dangerous. A colder and more realistic Tory 'national interest' view may now be required and yet the Tories are likely to take no major action where it really matters - a plan to diversify the national economy and reduce its vulnerabilities.

The next election will solve nothing in itself. We may have to wait another electoral cycle for a viable national survival policy or accept full integration into the European Project and the transfer of our voice, finally and without return, to Brussels.

Friday
Sep042009

On the Minds of Nations

What are nations? Now there's a big question.

They are territorial yet their laws of domicile can cover assets far away from their homelands whether as informal or formal empire. They are certainly not the possessions of their peoples in any meaningful way despite the elaborate liberal theory claiming otherwise.

Can a nation have a mind? Nothing can have a mind existentially except an individual person (unless you are a believer in some world-soul), yet nations behave as if they have personalities or minds of their own. They appear to have essentialised existence after the fact.

Nations raise major philosophical questions about our own humanity. How can a single person or a committee of persons, elected or in power through a coup or by chance, become the epicentre of the destinies of millions - and, in great wars, hundreds of millions?

How was it that Napoleon Bonaparte could so manage his society that he could leave Poland with 690,000 men in 1812 and return with only 93,000 yet see not one assassination attempt or coup from the relations of his apparently willing victims?

It seems that we can be managed into a lemming-like state with surprising ease.

Whatever the answers, national societies, almost all of either dynastic origin (essentially the war band) or outgrowths of party-led liberation struggles against the heirs of war bands, seem to have developed 'social personalities' and something close to an organic life cycle.

National defence and security policies appear to follow the patterns of behaviour of persons in a Hobbesian universe. Every state at any time appears to be somewhere on the following continuum, each phase shading into the next ...

  • the expansion of the war band into a vacuum - or rather an apparent vacuum created by the differential in technologies between a predator and the predated, with the only difference between imperialisms being whether the predation is for profit (dynastic) or ideological (liberatory)
  • the settling of interstitiary vacuums between rival powers of equivalent or near-equivalent strength - this is the boundary-setting and soft power competition in a multi-power world that seems to be taking place today
  • the defence of integrity, with varying degrees of fear that stronger powers might decide to become a nouveau war band (as national socialism decided to do quite consciously), instead of looking elsewhere and in other ways for profit and influence (assuming such options are available)

Although we might like to fantasise about world government and about noble democracies maintaining peace in our time, the reality is that even the most open democracies behave somewhere along this continuum in ways that are less than altruistic.

If anything, because of the need to justify their position to themselves (another 'human' trait), a hybridisation of inherited dynastic self interest and of the export of values in the Western democracies muddies the water further.

Internal contradictions will always create more heat than light in internal foreign policy debate about the precise nature of the national interest. That is why Gordon Brown appears terrified of admitting the truth about energy and strategic interests in relation to Libya and falls back on the 'war on terror' chestnut.

This is all being raised because we (TPPR) tend to take a hyper-realist view of international relations, one that emphasises that there is little new under the sun and that the primal drives of nations, like persons, are only thinly veneered by reason.

Wherever we look, we see 'histories' that are redacted to maintain cohesion and inconvenient interpretations or alternative explanations of the past and of others' pasts being edited out, much as personal memories are self-edited in order to construct personality.

Wherever we look, we see, regardless of the huge diversity of individual personalities within nations, the observable fact of a 'national character', predispositions and attitudes that are not imposed by elites on people but appear to be shared by both elites and people in a dialectic of mutual myth creation.

Mircea Eliade was a pioneer in bringing to our attention how myth was not something Greeks did but something that is omni-present in our own contemporary narratives. The interplay between past, emotion, reason, convention and obligations or guilt are present in nations as in persons.

It might even be argued that new mythic personalities have emerged for trans-national ideologies that compete within nations for control of nations and that nations themselves are constantly struggling to 'square' contradictory mythic personalities internally in order to maintain their cohesion.

International relations might also be considered analogous to relations between persons. Persons can be rational in pursuing their interests externally but the interests themselves (or 'constructed personality') are not necessarily wholly rational.

We reject, however, the idea of the psychotic State (the liberal myth of Nazi Germany) because a psychotic State would not be able to hold its own personality together. Somalia may be psychotic, interwar Germany was not - it was deeply neurotic.

But we do retain the notion of the neurotic State, the functioning State that is still highly disturbed and capable of causing friction and even a fist fight with its neighbours - or blundering into slighting the fragile ego of another State so that it throws a punch.

All this sounds like conservative pessimism but there is no reason to believe that we are doomed to centuries of Napoleonic egos leading sheep to slaughter.

As in 'real life' (international affairs has an air of fantasy sometimes little different from tales of Narnia or of Middle Earth), bad behaviour can be contained.

In 'real life', we have a police force (or a strong headteacher or parents), or we have a culture of constraint and restraint from birth or we learn to be less neurotic over time through experience, will or therapy. To some liberals, our police force might be world government or a truly dominant hegemon.

The problem here is one liberals refuse to face. Whether world government or hegemon, this single 'State' would still have a personality of sorts, would still be the creature of its history and the mythic presumptions of its constituents and would not be the rational actor of progressive fantasy.

Moreover, neither of the two great hegemons of the last two hundred years (the Pax Britannica from 1815 to 1914 or the US informal imperium which subsisted briefly over the two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union) have evidenced anything other than self interest and self regard as to values.

Like Rome, they merely expanded to fill a vacuum and they were forced to retreat when their values and claims were resisted by equal and countervailing forces and when the costs of filling the vacuum proved greater than the benefits.

On the other hand, the model of a culture of constraint that accept the neurotics and psychopaths in our midst and works around them, calling in the police only when necessary, was the ideal of the failed League of Nations and the failing United Nations.

It depends on everyone knowing the rules, everyone abiding by the rules and effective police power being in place when the rules are broken. This consensus is breaking down within liberal democracies so there is every reason to believe the situation is no better at a global level.

Unfortunately, the 'real world' analogy for our current international legal framework is village policing in the eighteenth century. The global village is run by the squire and parson with one rule for them and another for the local peasants.

Given that (to extend the analogy) the squire's sons are partial to seducing or even raping the village girls occasionally, an international system like this is doomed to create resentment and resistance.

A third way of dealing with the situation is the analogically personal - that each person/nation becomes emotionally stable in themselves, compassionate towards others but realistic about the need to retain their own reserve power when faced by others less stable and less giving.

You might call this benign nationalism, integral, non-interfering elsewhere, concentrating on economic strength and security yet supportive of any measures that remove the anarchy 'out there' within its means.

Unfortunately, many persons 'out there' have the illusion that they are emotionally stable when they are not. This lack of self-knowledge also applies to the complacent faux-democracies of the West.

If nations have minds and personalities and there is little that we as individuals can do except our bit in rewiring a few of the national neurones in competition with millions of others, where should we direct that tiny bit of energy?

Free-for-all Hobbesian international affairs, like the market, works but at immense cost. Like punctuated equilibrium in evolution, long periods of peace and trade get interrupted by horrible episodes of limbic breakdown, like the Thirty Years War or the horrors of China between 1911 and 1949 and beyond.

If we want to live like that, fine, but progressive dreams of 'world government' are no solution. In the end, without other reforms, it will become an 'authoritarian personality' that begs for its own revolt and resistance. Its eventual collapse will mean that we are back where we started.

If we want better, then there are only two ways forward. The first is the radical reform of the United Nations so that it is no longer the vehicle of the squire and the parson but acts in a more limited way than it has been doing to provide basic rule of law and justice for the peasants (the weak nations).

Second, and equally important, national personalities have to be recognised and encouraged to develop in ways that are far less dynastic, far less ideological and far more attuned to the actual life needs of the general population.

I suppose we are saying that, in order to preclude another case where 690,000 men (and women) are directed into some snowy waste and then only 93,000 return, foreign and security policy needs to be taken out of the hands of dynastic successor politicians such as Presidents and be democratised.

If liberals want to avoid the conservative pessimism of our realpolitik analysis, then they need to stop flaffing around with grand visions and get down to basics:

  • a more limited in scope but stronger, fairer and more independent UN with teeth and
  • the radical democratisation of their own bourgeois democracies before they interfere in the affairs of less developed states.

Strong stable and responsive democracies prepared to concede some of their own interest to the international rule of law - now that's the basis for peace and security!

This is not perhaps what the functional heirs to Sceaf of the Angles or Ascaric of the Franks want to hear but, hey, a mature personality eventually grows up and put away the toy guns and childhood gangs and so should nations.