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Entries in Helmand (2)

Monday
Jul202009

Why The Afghan War Is Unwinnable ...

Political tensions in the UK over its participation in the Afghan War continue with former Defence Secretary Hutton now backing the generals over their supply concerns. 60% of the British polled think Brown is fighting this war on the cheap.

69% also think that the stabilisation of Afghanistan is not worth risking British troops’ lives for. The Army also appears to have declined to let the Prime Minister meet troops on the front line in Helmand Province as an operational distraction. Make of that what you will ...

History Repeats Itself

The situation, from a British perspective parallels the situation faced by Russia in 1979. A political decision has been imposed on a military infrastructure that is not fitted to the job with the resources at its disposal. The military have pointed this out.

The politicians, in that way that can-do desk jockeys have, have treated the Generals like middle managers and told them just to go ahead and do it. The result is predictable – a disaster in the making.

Propaganda operations back in the UK continue to emphasise British military bravery and the alleged viciousness of the Taliban. However, this only serves to encourage public support for the military without ending the questions about what we are doing there in the first place.

The UK Parliament goes into recess on July 21st. It does not return to Westminster until October 12th. This will shift the story from Parliament to the media, giving the Government a three month breathing space so long as it avoids a Dien Bien Phu. Some rethinking is needed before the Party Conference.

What is interesting is that the US itself (led by Defense Secretary Gates) is now making noises about its own public and military not being willing to stay for too long in the theatre. US legislators are beginning to follow their UK counterparts in questioning both strategy and the current level of casualties.

Yesterday, a civilian helicopter crashed killing 16 at a southern NATO base and the Taliban issued a video of a captured US soldier so the whole business gets messier by the day.

Meanwhile, the British are stuck with their ‘poodle’ status. They are in the field because the Americans have told them to be there. There is room for much domestic political embarrassment if the President rethinks his policy.

The poodle then has to trot in the other direction despite saying that the whole adventure was central to British national security.

You can imagine General Ustinov (Ainsworth) assuring General Ogarkov (Dannatt) that the Politburo (Cabinet) was united on the campaign being essential for the protection of socialism (national security). It is not true, it just has to be believed to be true.

Absurd Premises

The Anglo-American diplomatic establishment and ‘hawks’ have an apparently simple strategy and it comprises two components:

  • the Pakistanis and the Afghans take their own lead in dealing with militant insurgency in their respective countries;
  • the West pours resources into the country into order to help secure victory.

This strategy is becoming increasingly absurd because neither ally is in a fit state to undertake a full blown quasi-civil war.

Equally, no-one with any political sense believes that the American and British public (let alone the Europeans) will see hospitals and schools being built for tribal Islamists in a far away country while their own public services are being cut or limited in their scope.

The strategy is dead in the water given the current unstable state of South Asian politics and the global economic crisis – but an awful lot of people have far too much to lose to admit this. And so young soldiers are killed needlessly … more out of stupdity than malice.

The real crisis is thus strategic and it lies within Afghan-Western relations. In effect, the West wants to win a war against an enemy and then invest in ‘hearts and minds’ as ground is secured. To do this, it wants the Afghans to create an army and fight alongside NATO.

Unfortunately, this is not how Karzai sees things. Karzai is clearly suspicious that the ground covered might result in elections that are not so free and fair, designed to get votes in for a challenger. This is probably paranoia but such paranoia is understandable in Afghan conditions.

Karzai is actively undercutting the NATO position (or rather the position of the US and the UK military) by insisting that Afghanistan does not need more troops at all. Karzai is defending his political position against both the Taliban and the West (who would much prefer a more amenable President).

Worse, Karzai is calling for direct negotiations with the Taliban, up to and including Mullah Omar. His position thus appears to be one of nation-building from within through political compromise and, of course, he is right. It was the Russian error in the 1970s not to take that risk.

Prognosis Poor

Karzai’s position may be common sense but it is also strategically difficult if a withdrawal from Pakistan by the Taliban is not included in the talks – and, of course, the US President would have a lot of explaining to do to Middle America of why he was prepared to talk to terrorists.

Talking to terrorists raises uncomfortable issues about Hamas and Iran and seems a betrayal of the work of counter-terrorist operatives working under dangerous conditions for half a decade. All is connected!

Afghan dissidents who accuse Karzai of an excessive compromise with warlords are also turning up in London where they meet with some sympathy. This progressive impulse towards action to expand liberal values muddies the waters with key political constituencies.

Since Blair re-introduced and Bush expanded the notion that force can be used to introduce such ‘universal values’, there have been many progressives prepared to consider young soldiers and civilian casualties as fodder for their armchair aspirations.

A more relevant issue is the actual winnability of the war with much media comment on Afghan insurgent history – the insurgents cede ground, go to the hills, return when the soldiers move on and leave the provincial centres to the invaders. These are the worst possible conditions for a democratic election.

The implication is either a permanent massive troop presence extending into the mountains far beyond Western political and military capability or the abandonment of villagers to their fate after they have exposed themselves by voting. Would you trust us if you were them?

We are reminded that the Soviets (a super power in their day) lost 15,000 men and were forced to leave in February 1989 after a decade (that would be 2013 for ‘our’ war). It was the only war that the Soviet Union ever lost and it contributed to the collapse of the sclerotic empire.

The only saving grace for the West is that history shows that it can lose wars and survive because of its political flexibility - but never without consequences. Now, as then, the politicians are trying to find ways to say that lives were not lost in vain. They certainly were and they probably are ….

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Friday
Jul032009

Short Note - Afghanistan

The US assault [Operation Khanjar] against the Taliban in Helmand Province has begun. 4,000 US marines supported by 650 Afghans are involved in the largest US-led operation since Falluja in Iraq. The aim is to clear up pockets where NATO’s writ fails to run.

The insurgents appear to have adopted their standard technique of melting into the background as troops advance up the southern Helmand valley. The US plans to hold ground and then ‘drink lots of tea … eat lots of goat’ to win over the community.

The importance of Helmand, which the British have failed to subdue and which saw the death on July 2nd of the highest-ranking officer, alongside a trooper, yet to be lost in a roadside bombing, is that it presents a supply route between the Afghan Taliban and the increasingly bitter bush wars in Pakistan.

A subsidiary aim is to put the Afghan Army under fire and to test its mettle, engaging it in direct conflict with the Taliban and so try to bring to an end certain ambiguities about local attitudes to NATO.

The Afghans and the US are often at loggerheads. The US has had to back down over airpower-based policies that have led to many civilian deaths. The Afghans have, meanwhile, been defending their ‘field eradication’ and ‘bribery’ strategies for dealing with the narcotics trade.

The US is not pleased that these policies seem to be having no effect on the revenue streams available to the Taliban. We presume that such policies reduce the amount of the crop but that they also raise the price from scarcity and that monetary incentives drift, in part, back to the insurgents.

Meanwhile, the Police Chief of Kandahar and eight other officers were killed in clashes with US-trained Afghan Special Forces, suggesting that the local police were somewhat ambiguous in their loyalties.

Countering local ambiguity over its mission has become central to NATO strategy. It needs its own sea of support in which to swim. Very many Afghans are still standing back, assuming that one day the West will be defeated and that they will have to live with the consequences.

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www.pendrywhite.com

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