Media commentary on the Iranian Presidential election continues. It is sour but it adds little to the fact on the ground which is that the street protest is over. Ahmedinejad has been confirmed as President which is much as we predicted would happen at the beginning.

The main theme of the commentary, as much in hope as from any rational assessment of the facts, is that the regime faces a crisis of legitimacy and that power struggles within the system will persist for some time to come.

It would be more accurate to say that the regime is facing a challenge to its legitimacy which may or may not be legitimate in itself. In response, the Iranian opposition is moving into a new phase, circling the wagons against repression with an attempt at unity.

Similar calls declaring the illegitimacy of the Ahmedinejad Government were issued by Moussavi, Karroubi (the second ‘reformist’ candidate) and the largest reformist party Mosharekat.

We are getting to that point where we will see either a new and vigorous reformist movement operating within the system or a direct threat to the regime being suppressed because it insists on challenging the system at its very core.

The EU’s brinkmanship with Iran continues. A (wobbly) deadline of this weekend was set for the withdrawal of its Ambassadors from Tehran if four local employees of the British Embassy were not released. These employees are being released but at the convenience and on the terms of Tehran.

As for a forthcoming G8 Statement, the signals are that the members are unlikely to condemn Iran for vote-rigging (there is simply no hard evidence of this). Any criticism is likely to be of the regime’s crackdown - an interference by very definition in the internal affairs of another sovereign State.

As might be expected, the Iranians are also toughening their stance on the nuclear issue, indicating the exclusion of the EU from talks and so placing the onus on the US to maintain its engagement.

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The Guardian Council has finally confirmed Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as the victor in the June 12th election. He will be President for a second term. The security forces, including the Basij, were on high alert.

The propaganda war between the two sides continues but the protests are virtually over, thanks to a firm crackdown by the regime. The bulk of the Western media remains firmly positioned on the side of the reformers.

Moussavi continued to try to keep his campaign for a re-run of the election going to the bitter end but it was steadily being contained. The reward for his persistence may now be some form of legal action against him and his supporters.

The diplomatic centre of attention is the arrest of nine (five were later released) Iranians who worked at the British Embassy. This was condemned by all 27 nations of the EU at the Foreign Ministers Summit in Corfu with a warning that they would respond firmly to any ‘harassment or intimidation’ of their staff.

The EU governments then warned Iran that they could recall their ambassadors and implicitly threatened sanctions if the remaining four British embassy Iranians were not released.

Analysts are becoming increasingly pessimistic about Obama’s strategy of engagement and see some serious re-thinking going on in Washington in due course.

The US continues to keep open the door to talks with Iran in Paris, but the room for manouevre must have been limited by Sarkozy’s aggressive comments on the regime. The European allies (the US is not in a position to go it alone on this matter) have been far more ‘hawkish’ than Washington.

The stakes are now very high, if only because the narrative (true or false) of Western intervention increases the chances of Iran deciding to defy both the West and Israeli threats and just going for its bomb.

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The Iranian revolt is falling into four broad story lines: what is actually happening on the street; the mobilisation locally and internationally of the reformers; the politics within the ruling elite; and international, largely Western, reactions (which we hope to deal with on another occasion).

Bringing Us Up To Date

Media analysis of Iranian internal affairs is highly speculative because of the limited access to events for the Western media. Pressure on foreign journalists has intensified greatly. The situation, from a Western perspective, is confused and opaque.

Anything might now happen – from swift resolution to civil war. We do note, however, that international interest in the revolt is beginning to drift a little and that the Iranian authorities are finally mounting a credible and co-ordinated propaganda fight-back of their own.

We note the riots, with ten officially notified as dead alongside the usual injuries and beatings. We note the rooftop protests and even talk by Moussavi of ‘martyrdom’ in Tehran but the very fact of bloody battles with the police tends to indicate that the street fight is going the regime’s way.

The point here is that the police have not refused to act alongside the Basij and there has not been a smidgeon of rumour as yet about military dissatisfaction. The authorities have now slipped into extreme ‘Cheney-speak’ by referring to the demonstrators as ‘terrorists’.

Nevertheless, the graphic death of a young woman created a major propaganda opportunity for reformists that was used globally to sustain outrage and support. The demonstrations are now spreading, on a small scale, to centres outside Iran wherever Iranian expatriates can be found.

Where Next?

Reformers are placing their trust (it seems) on the hope that the Revolutionary Guards (whom they believe are split and have factions supportive of Rafsanjani) will refuse to ‘fire on the crowd’.

But few believe that this will be a battle won for reformers in the streets - a few martyrs may be necessary but the issue will be decided within the ruling elite. Street fighting is merely the means to get a split in the ruling order. The State has too many instruments at its command otherwise.

Much of the ‘analysis’ (such as it is) therefore attempts to paint an implicit scenario in which pro-reform or exasperated elements within the ruling elite mount a coup against the Supreme Leader because the Supreme Leader has now backed Ahmedinejad unequivocally.

From this perspective, Khamenei may be regarded as fully complicit in the President's economic policies (the real concern of many of the potential ‘plotters’). Of course, we do not know (neither does anyone outside the persons involved) what precisely is going on at the opaque centre of things.

However, our working hypothesis is that a) the reformists are much weaker in the street than the West would like to believe and that b) to keep the street going some elite reformists are having to move into dangerous territory as they question the integrity of the regime.

The Need To Act Fast?

The stakes on the critical propaganda issue have been raised. The reformers are throwing all their cards on a claim that the election was not a matter of a bit of vote-rigging in the provinces but was pre-rigged at a national level months in advance.

If so, this plot must now be assumed to include the incumbent President and a naïve or complicit Supreme Leader. These are very grave charges which cut directly at the intelligence, integrity and honour of a religious leader. Will this now be interpreted as a direct challenge (by some) towards God?

This must raise severe doubts, amongst any ‘moderates’ who are not determined on the fall of the regime, about the consequences of going further. And of not going further at all ... reform elements within the ruling elite must be fearful that revolution could go badly for them if it is not carried through.

The arrest of four relatives of Rafsanjani at the weekend (although subsequently released) indicates just how close this crisis is impinging on key individuals.

The talk coming out of the reform movement is of a push to create a unified opposition front under the leadership of Moussavi. The end-game is pretty obvious now. If the official organs of the State can be made to turn on the 'unofficial' revolutionary movements, victory would then go to the coup leaders.

The Basis For A Coup

A coup by Rafsanjani could make him Supreme Leader backed by a President Moussavi with a large urban middle class and reform electoral base. The point is that such a coup, if pulled off constitutionally, would cause the police and the military to answer to legitimate authority.

This has to happen fast for two reasons:

• the ‘conservative’ camp is well aware of what has been going on and must be considering how it might constitutionally remove the plotters (as they see them). It shows weakness that they have not been able to act decisively in recent days.
• Moussavi, essentially an establishment figure, is being driven on to increasingly radical ground by the street. There must be a point of no return at which the plotters cannot hold the line against demands that they do not want to concede.

If a coup succeeds, the Basij and the Pasdarans may prove much flakier than the West has feared and, in effect, disband. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are not quite as disciplined or ideologically-driven as many think.

However, the longer the time it takes to seize power, the more opportunity there is for spines to be stiffened from the top and for the Islamic revolutionary element to mount a counter-coup. This cannot end well for some.

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