The Iranian revolt is falling into four broad story lines: what is actually happening on the street; the mobilisation locally and internationally of the reformers; the politics within the ruling elite; and international, largely Western, reactions (which we hope to deal with on another occasion).
Bringing Us Up To Date
Media analysis of Iranian internal affairs is highly speculative because of the limited access to events for the Western media. Pressure on foreign journalists has intensified greatly. The situation, from a Western perspective, is confused and opaque.
Anything might now happen – from swift resolution to civil war. We do note, however, that international interest in the revolt is beginning to drift a little and that the Iranian authorities are finally mounting a credible and co-ordinated propaganda fight-back of their own.
We note the riots, with ten officially notified as dead alongside the usual injuries and beatings. We note the rooftop protests and even talk by Moussavi of ‘martyrdom’ in Tehran but the very fact of bloody battles with the police tends to indicate that the street fight is going the regime’s way.
The point here is that the police have not refused to act alongside the Basij and there has not been a smidgeon of rumour as yet about military dissatisfaction. The authorities have now slipped into extreme ‘Cheney-speak’ by referring to the demonstrators as ‘terrorists’.
Nevertheless, the graphic death of a young woman created a major propaganda opportunity for reformists that was used globally to sustain outrage and support. The demonstrations are now spreading, on a small scale, to centres outside Iran wherever Iranian expatriates can be found.
Where Next?
Reformers are placing their trust (it seems) on the hope that the Revolutionary Guards (whom they believe are split and have factions supportive of Rafsanjani) will refuse to ‘fire on the crowd’.
But few believe that this will be a battle won for reformers in the streets - a few martyrs may be necessary but the issue will be decided within the ruling elite. Street fighting is merely the means to get a split in the ruling order. The State has too many instruments at its command otherwise.
Much of the ‘analysis’ (such as it is) therefore attempts to paint an implicit scenario in which pro-reform or exasperated elements within the ruling elite mount a coup against the Supreme Leader because the Supreme Leader has now backed Ahmedinejad unequivocally.
From this perspective, Khamenei may be regarded as fully complicit in the President's economic policies (the real concern of many of the potential ‘plotters’). Of course, we do not know (neither does anyone outside the persons involved) what precisely is going on at the opaque centre of things.
However, our working hypothesis is that a) the reformists are much weaker in the street than the West would like to believe and that b) to keep the street going some elite reformists are having to move into dangerous territory as they question the integrity of the regime.
The Need To Act Fast?
The stakes on the critical propaganda issue have been raised. The reformers are throwing all their cards on a claim that the election was not a matter of a bit of vote-rigging in the provinces but was pre-rigged at a national level months in advance.
If so, this plot must now be assumed to include the incumbent President and a naïve or complicit Supreme Leader. These are very grave charges which cut directly at the intelligence, integrity and honour of a religious leader. Will this now be interpreted as a direct challenge (by some) towards God?
This must raise severe doubts, amongst any ‘moderates’ who are not determined on the fall of the regime, about the consequences of going further. And of not going further at all ... reform elements within the ruling elite must be fearful that revolution could go badly for them if it is not carried through.
The arrest of four relatives of Rafsanjani at the weekend (although subsequently released) indicates just how close this crisis is impinging on key individuals.
The talk coming out of the reform movement is of a push to create a unified opposition front under the leadership of Moussavi. The end-game is pretty obvious now. If the official organs of the State can be made to turn on the 'unofficial' revolutionary movements, victory would then go to the coup leaders.
The Basis For A Coup
A coup by Rafsanjani could make him Supreme Leader backed by a President Moussavi with a large urban middle class and reform electoral base. The point is that such a coup, if pulled off constitutionally, would cause the police and the military to answer to legitimate authority.
This has to happen fast for two reasons:
- the ‘conservative’ camp is well aware of what has been going on and must be considering how it might constitutionally remove the plotters (as they see them). It shows weakness that they have not been able to act decisively in recent days.
- Moussavi, essentially an establishment figure, is being driven on to increasingly radical ground by the street. There must be a point of no return at which the plotters cannot hold the line against demands that they do not want to concede.
If a coup succeeds, the Basij and the Pasdarans may prove much flakier than the West has feared and, in effect, disband. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are not quite as disciplined or ideologically-driven as many think.
However, the longer the time it takes to seize power, the more opportunity there is for spines to be stiffened from the top and for the Islamic revolutionary element to mount a counter-coup. This cannot end well for some.
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