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Entries in Afghanistan (7)

Monday
Mar152010

Afghanistan & British Electoral Politics

We have not looked at Afghanistan as an issue since the High Summer of last year or commented in depth on British foreign policy since the Autumn. Why is this?

Partly because there has been nothing new to say and partly because comment on British policy in West Asia has degenerated into a political sideshow, a subject for knockabout between two political parties seeking to win an election later this Spring.

Miliband's Compton Lecture

David Miliband's Compton Lecture on March 10th might be regarded as the last serious pre-election attempt by the Government to establish precisely what it is doing in this faraway country before a disenchanted public adds it to the melange of issues that will decide its fate.

Within the first few words, he managed to encapsulate what New Labour stands for and to reaffirm the ideology of engagement - enlightenment values in a transatlantic context.

We have recently thrown some doubt on the viability of the latest iteration of the Enlightenment project as an idealism that can be destructive in its attempts to impose systems on the crooked timber of humanity but Miliband has no such concerns.

He gives three reasons for engagement in Afghanistan. Two of these lodge New Labour firmly in a grand strategic camp in which the national interest is seen as identical to that of its chief ally expressed within an idealist and abstract notion of the 'West'.

Naturally, he cannot walk away from the prime motive for engagement that is presented to the British people - that we have to be there because the West Asian badlands pose a terror threat at home.

What is never said is that our active post-imperial engagement with the margins of the West fuels the very insurgency that might be imported back into the country and that some post-imperial ethnic minorities within the UK are disengaged from the Crown, in part, by such actions.

To the costs of the war must be added the costs of a complex 'soft' power operation to monitor and manage lower income ethnic communities, of an almost comically belt and braces security operation around the country and of trying to outmanouevre the extremists' equally evil twin, the BNP.

If we add to this the divisiveness of the war, popular anger and irritation at security measures, the palpable growth in tension between ethnic communities ... all at a time of economic difficulty ... it seems an expensive way of dealing with a threat which is not entirely proven as to its extent or importance.

Party & Crown

The truth is that a balanced budget and internal social cohesion are regarded as wholly worth sacrificing on the altars of the transatlantic alliance and the 'future of Western power'.

In other words, the tragedy of New Labour is that, after over hundred years of struggle to become the dominant ruling party in the country, it has become the Party of Pitt, Walpole, Wellington and Castlereagh rather than the Party of Paine, Jefferson, Shelley and Blake. It has become the Crown.

It is the Crown (not the House of Windsor but the State) that has determined, for complex historical reasons related to its power and institutional ambition, that the transatlantic alliance, NATO and the West represent a community in which it must have a place or have no meaning.

There is an historic rationale for this (albeit an imperialist one) and, even today, there are sound economic and strategic arguments for good relations with the United States, collective security and the defence of core liberal values in a global setting.

But this is not what is happening here. This is not good relations with the US, it is Alliance. It is not just collective security, it is NATO. It is not just defence of values but promotion and extension of values. The qualitative difference is important and it is proving immensely costly.

The Necessity For Settlement

We will leave you to read Miliband's lecture. You may decide whether to be persuaded or not. What is clear is that Miliband knows that our country can no longer afford the forward policy begun under Tony Blair in the late 1990s and he is looking for an 'exit' without the political costs of being seen to withdraw.

Strip away the tub-thumping, the 'our boys' talk and the attacks on the evils of the other side and what it comes down to is a simple fact.

If the West had more resources (and more support at home) it probably could win eventually but the scepticism of the British public, lack of support from wiser heads in Europe and growing budgetary problems no longer give the Government the option of being in on the kill or leading from the front.

With an election on the way, what New Labour has to do is demonstrate that past investment was worthwhile in support of what will be an American victory - or ensure that it withdraws with dignity and honour long before it turns into a wider West Asian American quagmire.

A close reading of the Lecture tells us just how much Western objectives have changed from the heady days when liberal progressives thought that they could bring their much vaunted Enlightenment values, to Afghan women in particular, through the barrel of a gun.

The British and Soviet imperial histories are used by Miliband to demonstrate that the Afghans cannot be beaten into submission but have to be seduced into "a self-governing, self-policing but heavily subsidised Afghanistan, where the tribes balanced each other ..."

Ay, there's a rub. The British (who succeeded) and the Soviets (who failed) had an interest in heavy subsidy because the troubled country was a chaotic threat to contiguous interests whether the British hold over Indian wealth or Soviet determination to maintain order amongst its ethnic minorities.

The essence of such Imperial strategies was complicity in a protection racket - sufficient funds would be applied to keep the Afghans concerned with topping each other rather than interfering in neighbouring countries. So much for Enlightenment idealism!

But Why Us?

But what on earth is the interest of the United Kingdom, an island on the edge of another continent within a global trading system that scarcely touches these backwoods, in taking part in the levels of heavy subsidy that are undoubtedly at the heart of of Miliband's Grand Master Plan.

Of course, Miliband is not expecting the British to pay, he expects the electorates of the 'West' to pay, that is hard-pressed Americans and Europeans who have far more worries about bailing out Greece than about the baksheesh expectations of Afghan tribesman.

All this effort seems increasingly absurd when compared with the exposure of another island nation with a similar profile, Japan, operating a similar distance from the country concerned and with equal dependence on Gulf oil.

Unless British foreign policy makers are genuinely and insanely concerned with the preservation of neighbouring empires (Russia, China, India) from dissolution regardless of the effects on the national budget, there are only two motives for the expenditure of blood and gold by the Crown.

Neither can be spoken of in blunt terms because, if the British population understood what was being said, there might be a political reaction that could lose this Government its mandate.

Social Cohesion At Home

The first truth is not that terrorism might be imported into British cities from Afghanistan but if Afghanistan is not settled then the destabilisation of Pakistan and so of Kashmir really does threaten to bring sectarian war into British cities - and not necessarily just as Islamism.

What discomforts the British is that post-imperial mass immigration, promoted for economic and ideological reasons, and not discouraged by a New Labour Government that gains significant votes from these communities, would very soon be linked to violent social disorder.

The size and spread of the warring communities and their concentration in the poorest areas of our major post-industrial cities creates a nightmare scenario for the Crown - one where Enlightenment values crumble in a local competition for resources fuelled for profit by radical ideologues.

The link between terrorism and mass migration is one that has not been proved. Discussion has sometimes been silenced as 'racist' - but anyone who watches the push and pull between the poorest communities and their homelands and growing 'ressentiment' amongst indigenous rivals is concerned.

So, for this reason alone, both Crown and New Labour (indistinguishable in their concern for social order) have increased the number of authoritarian tools for social control and have pressed, under security advice, to get the rest of the West engaged in settling Afghanistan before the infection spreads.

When Miliband speaks of earlier British imperial settlements designed to protect British investment in India, it suggests that his settlement is required to avoid the real cost of that massive overseas empire - chaos in an aging urban-industrial structure with low wage populations whose allegiances are obscure.

The Burden Of History

A second 'real' reason for engagement with Afghanistan derives from another burden from history - in this case, recognition of strategic and economic dependence on the US. This is an old story that does not need to be told again here - it is about the necessary displacement of one empire by another.

The point is not that this has happened but that New Labour and the Crown have become the depressed victims of that history. Questions are being raised that directly affect British post-imperial strategy.

First, is the dominance of London as global centre (which is the central economic core of the transatlantic alliance) really in the interests of the British people as a whole?

Equally to the point, have the interests of Crown, City and Alliance become wholly detached from the interests of the nation in the light of the recent economic crisis? This is more salient when we consider the social order questions raised by our decaying urban-industrial infrastructure (see above!).

Our engagement in West Asia would appear to require taxing the population to sustain the interests of Crown, City and Alliance. The economic benefits from that bloc may be regarded as questionable looked at from a council estate in outer Manchester or amongst the small retailers of Guildford.

Second, much as the British like to preen and swagger about their world status, no different of course in this from the French, the question arises as to why we bother when most people are not nationalist in orientation in the traditional way and would much rather the quiet life without ideology or 'service'?

The Crown and conservative authoritarians of all parties may like 'Great Power Status' [GPS] but it is becoming increasingly costly. The tension between the costs of sustaining it and maintaining social cohesion become much more manifest as economic conditions worsen (as we noted some years ago).

GPS is sustained through the same sort of legerdemain that has put New Labour in control of the State through means that undermine the nation. In this case, Britain's 'destiny' as an independent power is being undermined by a determination to seek GPS under the wing of another power.

The Politics Of Confusion

Miliband's Lecture is intelligent and informative but he cannot raise these questions himself because in so doing he would undermine the very basis for New Labour's role which relies both on denial about post-imperial causes of social disorder and on promoting the illusion of GPS.

Afghanistan, far more than Iraq which was just a costly mistake with no long-lasting effects on national cohesion, pulls together all the internal contradictions within the New Labour project.

The desire to build votes on economic growth and full employment has created the conditions for social disorder that owe too much to accidents of history on the North West Frontier while its determination to strut for its right-wing vote on the world stage continues to turn the country into a poodle. 

In the long run, Afghanistan can be 'won'. The US might well be able to afford to settle a dowry for peace of sufficient size through its massive security budget but that settlement might be, for the British, a horribly expensive way to invest in maintaining social order in Britain's inner cities.

Many may ask why we lacked the courage to by-pass this war and just take our gold, put it into our troubled communities and save blood not only overseas but perhaps, one day, at home.

Wednesday
Jul292009

The British Dream of Peace in Afghanistan

Before we make our promised shift of emphasis from the periphery of the West to its Eurasian core, we should take our last look for a long while at the worsening situation in Afghanistan.

The Taliban struck this week at government buildings in Khost, near a US base (deploying three suicide bombers). This suggests that a bloody disruption of the electoral campaign might be on the cards.

To the South, the US has asked Pakistan to deploy troops at key points on its border with Pakistan to restrict Taliban movements. The troubled state of Pakistan needs no further comment here.

To the North, there is a growing crisis in Tajikistan. President Rakhmon has been calling on the population to stockpile food to ensure food security for the next two years as the economy weakens and violence threatens to spread from Afghanistan.

The Political Solution?

Nevertheless, the British are now claiming to have achieved their ends in Helmand, implying a halt to offensive military activity and an attempt to hold ground for the election. The British have also sent another 125 troops to Afghanistan.

Yet the military warns the public of more tough fighting in the weeks to come. What precisely is happening and to what purpose remains confused. Conflicting messages from almost every party engaged in this war means that little that is said can be wholly trusted.

The tactic of holding urban territory is designed to do little more than create the conditions for a sufficiently successful election so that it can subsequently be claimed that democracy has achieved a foothold.

The Afghan people need to believe that the ground held will not be abandoned once they have voted. As it dawns on policymakers that ground cannot be held by military force alone for very long, except at a high cost in men and money, there is little alternative left but a ‘political solution’.

The phrase ‘political solution’ really means cutting deals with warlords and ‘moderate’ Taliban (in effect, less ideological regional affiliates and allies of the Taliban). The theory states that you start the process by hitting these people hard with your 'superior' military force.

Once you have proved your military capability, you send in emissaries for a dialogue. Political deals then detach a region, handing it over to a local elite in return for some central Government presence, some commitment to liberal values, some local control over reconstruction funds and peace.

The Afghan warlords have to believe that the West can sustain a long conflict and be ruthless in pursuing their ends. This assumes that they are not clever enough to log into British news web sites and work out for themselves that there is no real stomach for the fight in the enemy's home camp.

In terms of hearts and minds, the Western effort seems doomed from the start - doubts about its willingness to be ruthless in battle, doubts about its determination to hang on for years, doubts about whether it can protect the people in the provinces from revenge and ethnic cleansing.

Government Through Audit

British Ministers are now touting the strategy in the classic mode of politicians who believe that if you say something loud enough it will happen. In this case, there is an almost obsessive riff on the need to extirpate corruption. Why?

Bribing warlords to get peace is one thing, but subsequent reconstruction funds cannot be seen to be bribes or funds granted without proper auditing. National legislatures will soon close off funding if the cash does not go to build bridges, schools and hospitals.

There is a similar attempt at audit and control in Somalia where the situation is even more dire. The pro-Western Somalis scarcely control the capital city, let alone the countryside.

Without scrutiny, warlords may invest the cash in bolt-holes overseas, open foreign bank accounts, reinvest in illegal trades or build up their local clientage. Yet how precisely the West will sustain peace without some form of personal reward for local elites and their followers has still not been explained.

Much of the chatter is directed at the British public and not at the Afghan people. It is an attempt to give some purpose to military losses and to hold the line against calls to withdraw. The British public need to feel that their soldiery are the 'goodies' in this struggle and this is still not entirely clear.

Fortunately for the Government, the immediate crisis will pass with the Afghan elections. All the UK Government needs then is some kind of relatively inexpensive stalemate between now and the British General Election which has a vaguely ethical underpinning.

The Afghan Perspective

All this presupposes that the 'moderate' Taliban themselves are minded to accept NATO’s implicit offer to deal and that the US and the Afghan Government stay in line with this approach – and that events in Pakistan do not muddy the waters further. 

The strategy becomes questionable if the Taliban are either pushed too hard and make examples of those who enter into dialogue (which has happened in the past) or begin to make serious military progress and see no reason to talk.

US ‘hawks’ really do not like this policy of engagement and are saying so. NATO, and so the British, have to demonstrate to the Afghan people not only that they are in for the long haul but perhaps will talk with ‘moderate’ Islamists elsewhere on equal terms. The precedent is disturbing for some in Washington.

It is hard to promise long term engagement when Western publics see no reason for public spending cuts to finance foreign adventures but 'talks with terrorists' could create significant political problems for Obama in Congress.

If a policy of talking to 'terrorists' catches hold, then many Americans will not be very impressed. We must not forget that we are in the early stages of a peace process further to the west which is ineluctably moving towards some kind of dialogue with Hamas if not with Hezbollah.

Conveniently, almost to order, the Afghan Government delivered a truce with the Taliban in Badghis Province (North West border near Turkmenistan) this week that will (assuming it is as real as it is claimed) permit the August 20th election to be held peaceably in the region.

Our suspicion is that the fine print of this deal would tell us a great deal about what the Afghans and West were prepared to signal as concessions to local insurgents but we do not have access to anything that has not been filtered for propaganda effect.

None of this is what the neo-conservatives or liberal progressives had in mind when they called the original invasion a liberation. The best that can be hoped for is a liberalised moderation of traditional culture in yet another attempt to turn this mountainous country into some semblance of a modern State.

This modernisation attempt is really little more than what the rough-hewn Afghan communists tried in the late 1970s. They emphasised Marxism, secularism and modernisation. The more sophisticated Afghan liberals of today emphasise democracy, human rights and modernisation.

Thirty years of bloody intervention have reduced us to hoping that we can reach the 'square one' of thirty years ago. Whether from inept Soviet or incompetent Western dabbling, Afghanistan has managed to lose three decades of development in the meantime.

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Monday
Jul202009

Why The Afghan War Is Unwinnable ...

Political tensions in the UK over its participation in the Afghan War continue with former Defence Secretary Hutton now backing the generals over their supply concerns. 60% of the British polled think Brown is fighting this war on the cheap.

69% also think that the stabilisation of Afghanistan is not worth risking British troops’ lives for. The Army also appears to have declined to let the Prime Minister meet troops on the front line in Helmand Province as an operational distraction. Make of that what you will ...

History Repeats Itself

The situation, from a British perspective parallels the situation faced by Russia in 1979. A political decision has been imposed on a military infrastructure that is not fitted to the job with the resources at its disposal. The military have pointed this out.

The politicians, in that way that can-do desk jockeys have, have treated the Generals like middle managers and told them just to go ahead and do it. The result is predictable – a disaster in the making.

Propaganda operations back in the UK continue to emphasise British military bravery and the alleged viciousness of the Taliban. However, this only serves to encourage public support for the military without ending the questions about what we are doing there in the first place.

The UK Parliament goes into recess on July 21st. It does not return to Westminster until October 12th. This will shift the story from Parliament to the media, giving the Government a three month breathing space so long as it avoids a Dien Bien Phu. Some rethinking is needed before the Party Conference.

What is interesting is that the US itself (led by Defense Secretary Gates) is now making noises about its own public and military not being willing to stay for too long in the theatre. US legislators are beginning to follow their UK counterparts in questioning both strategy and the current level of casualties.

Yesterday, a civilian helicopter crashed killing 16 at a southern NATO base and the Taliban issued a video of a captured US soldier so the whole business gets messier by the day.

Meanwhile, the British are stuck with their ‘poodle’ status. They are in the field because the Americans have told them to be there. There is room for much domestic political embarrassment if the President rethinks his policy.

The poodle then has to trot in the other direction despite saying that the whole adventure was central to British national security.

You can imagine General Ustinov (Ainsworth) assuring General Ogarkov (Dannatt) that the Politburo (Cabinet) was united on the campaign being essential for the protection of socialism (national security). It is not true, it just has to be believed to be true.

Absurd Premises

The Anglo-American diplomatic establishment and ‘hawks’ have an apparently simple strategy and it comprises two components:

  • the Pakistanis and the Afghans take their own lead in dealing with militant insurgency in their respective countries;
  • the West pours resources into the country into order to help secure victory.

This strategy is becoming increasingly absurd because neither ally is in a fit state to undertake a full blown quasi-civil war.

Equally, no-one with any political sense believes that the American and British public (let alone the Europeans) will see hospitals and schools being built for tribal Islamists in a far away country while their own public services are being cut or limited in their scope.

The strategy is dead in the water given the current unstable state of South Asian politics and the global economic crisis – but an awful lot of people have far too much to lose to admit this. And so young soldiers are killed needlessly … more out of stupdity than malice.

The real crisis is thus strategic and it lies within Afghan-Western relations. In effect, the West wants to win a war against an enemy and then invest in ‘hearts and minds’ as ground is secured. To do this, it wants the Afghans to create an army and fight alongside NATO.

Unfortunately, this is not how Karzai sees things. Karzai is clearly suspicious that the ground covered might result in elections that are not so free and fair, designed to get votes in for a challenger. This is probably paranoia but such paranoia is understandable in Afghan conditions.

Karzai is actively undercutting the NATO position (or rather the position of the US and the UK military) by insisting that Afghanistan does not need more troops at all. Karzai is defending his political position against both the Taliban and the West (who would much prefer a more amenable President).

Worse, Karzai is calling for direct negotiations with the Taliban, up to and including Mullah Omar. His position thus appears to be one of nation-building from within through political compromise and, of course, he is right. It was the Russian error in the 1970s not to take that risk.

Prognosis Poor

Karzai’s position may be common sense but it is also strategically difficult if a withdrawal from Pakistan by the Taliban is not included in the talks – and, of course, the US President would have a lot of explaining to do to Middle America of why he was prepared to talk to terrorists.

Talking to terrorists raises uncomfortable issues about Hamas and Iran and seems a betrayal of the work of counter-terrorist operatives working under dangerous conditions for half a decade. All is connected!

Afghan dissidents who accuse Karzai of an excessive compromise with warlords are also turning up in London where they meet with some sympathy. This progressive impulse towards action to expand liberal values muddies the waters with key political constituencies.

Since Blair re-introduced and Bush expanded the notion that force can be used to introduce such ‘universal values’, there have been many progressives prepared to consider young soldiers and civilian casualties as fodder for their armchair aspirations.

A more relevant issue is the actual winnability of the war with much media comment on Afghan insurgent history – the insurgents cede ground, go to the hills, return when the soldiers move on and leave the provincial centres to the invaders. These are the worst possible conditions for a democratic election.

The implication is either a permanent massive troop presence extending into the mountains far beyond Western political and military capability or the abandonment of villagers to their fate after they have exposed themselves by voting. Would you trust us if you were them?

We are reminded that the Soviets (a super power in their day) lost 15,000 men and were forced to leave in February 1989 after a decade (that would be 2013 for ‘our’ war). It was the only war that the Soviet Union ever lost and it contributed to the collapse of the sclerotic empire.

The only saving grace for the West is that history shows that it can lose wars and survive because of its political flexibility - but never without consequences. Now, as then, the politicians are trying to find ways to say that lives were not lost in vain. They certainly were and they probably are ….

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