As widely predicted, General Petraeus has recommended a pause in troop draw-down in Iraq for at least 45 days after the ‘surge’ troops withdraw in the summer.

He was also specific that Al-Maliki’s operation in Basra was against his advice and was poorly planned. He refers to the security created by the surge as “fragile”. The situation in some areas is “unsatisfactory” and “innumerable challenges remain”.

Surge - Success or Prelude to Civil War?

Petraeus' recommendation would leave 140,000 troops in place for a little longer while ‘consolidation and evaluation’ took place. It is left open whether the 45 days might be extended but the possibility is not negligible.

On a tactical level, the ‘surge’ is undoubtedly a success. Despite a recent increase in tension and violence, the overall picture is one of a massive reduction in deaths (especially civilian deaths) since the end of 2006 and a significant fall in high profile attacks since this time last year.

Whatever one thinks of the war, the US military has responded to global criticism and has operated effectively to move the country from violent anarchy to the early stages of state formation (or rather re-formation).

But closer analysis suggests that the reason for the change in circumstances owes as much to political deals and compromises as military deployment. The military presence in itself would have achieved nothing without some change in American attitudes.

But the story may not have a happy ending after all. What the ‘surge’ has also done is to create a countervailing force to the Shia militia which has certainly tamed insurgency, albeit selectively, but which has also increased the risks of civil war in doing so.

The Problem of Al-Sadr

The political strategy behind the surge replaced one problem with another. US troops, the Sunni conservative ‘awakening’ amongst the tribal leaders and the largely middle class and mostly Sunni ‘Sons of Iraq’ have been armed and mobilized not only against gangsters and Baathist and Al-Qaeda irreconcileables but also implicitly against the Mahdi Army.

The Mahdi Army have been slowly consolidating into a formidable military force in its own right under the partial protection of a 'truce' that served American purposes as much as Al-Sadr's. 

This truce was either the prelude to a mutual accomodation or to armed conflict and we are now about to find out which, as Al-Sadr threatens to end it.

Al-Sadr, in the light of a shift in American policy from alleged attempted assassination to recognition of his status, holds the key to the settlement of Iraq.

He has become central to the way that the dice will fall – proportionately, so does the conduct of the Government and the Sunni bloc towards Al-Sadr.

This is why Al-Sadr’s current threat to end the truce is a matter of grave concern. Al-Sadr’s implicit co-operation has been as important to American strategy as any Gulf cash-fuelled Sunni conservative resistance to extremists.

Al-Maliki's Impatience

The situation in Iraq now has an opportunity to get a whole lot worse because of a decision by Al-Maliki. Effectively defeated in an ill-conceived and poorly executed move against a stronger enemy, Al-Maliki is now in danger of compounding the error by removing the incentive for Al-Sadr not to engage in armed resistance.

But politicians are generally rational actors and Al-Maliki is probably no exception, so what can he be up to?

The most likely scenario before Basra was that Al-Sadr would slowly shift his movement into democratic constitutionalism. Decommissioning of arms might then take place after Al-Sadr had created a strong or even dominant role in Parliament.

However, there is an equal likelihood that Iraq would be faced with its own permanent state-within-a-state like Hezbollah in Lebanon.

If you wanted a strong and independent Iraq, you would accomodate Al-Sadr. You might even accomodate Al-Sadr if you wanted a strong and independent Iraq that, in the end, would remain within the Western family. After all, everything is negotiable on the right terms.

But if you feared that Al-Sadr would displace you politically, backed by his threat of armed resistance, or if you had a visceral dislike of militarised sub-national actors and feared what such actors might do to your interest if they captured the state democratically, then your interest would be in crushing the Mahdi Army before it grew and became truly indestructible.

Al-Maliki has now confronted Al-Sadr with a stark choice that seems designed for confrontation – to disband his militia or face exclusion from future Iraqi elections. This is very brave and stupid or it is very clever and rational. 

It is stupid if you want to avoid an early civil war but it is not if all your instincts are that the longer you leave action against the dissident militia, the stronger they get - and if you can force the occupiers to do your dirty work for you by provoking the other side into revolt, then all the better.

An Ultimatum To Risk All

Al-Sadr is almost certainly not in a position to disband his militia without guarantees about the conduct of constitutional democracy that could not be delivered. Al-Sadr would be a fool to agree on guarantees that might be offered by either SCIRI and Al-Maliki or the occupiers.

Al-Maliki made his ultimatum on CNN which suggests an appeal to US public opinion (the rest of the West looks on aghast at the sudden deterioration of conditions in the country).

His 'play' (such as it is) is predicated on drawing the US deeper into maintaining his power while he has a US Administration in place that cannot withdraw from the country. Perhaps he believes that he needs to put US military power decisively into play now or lose the opportunity forever.

The Sadrists, naturally, rejected the demand and cited their role as a resistance movement against occupation – effectively stating that there would be no disbandment until Western troops had left.

There seems to be no room for manouevre. The scenario laid out by Al-Maliki for Al-Sadr to contemplate between readings of the Koran is of a disenfranchised armed militia watching an Iraqi State slowly accrue power, backed by the occupiers, until it is ready to send in armed troops to close it down by force.

On paper, we have a Sunni/Government/Western side now ready to face off a Shia/Iran side in a way that should seriously worry anyone fearing ‘another Vietnam’.

Vast forces are ready to be triggered at a moment's notice in what is really a struggle for power over the rebuilt state machinery between two wings of the Shia - the urbane and the sophisticated on the one side and the brute masses on the other.

Is There A Way Out?

There is a way out but it might split the Mahdi Army and create turbulence that might not descend into a civil war but which could extend insurgent violence by another year or two.

Al-Sadr has said that he will be consulting with Al-Sistani and others. This provides an opportunity for an extended negotiation and joint efforts (probably including Iran as well as the occupiers) to move the Mahdi Army from militia to constitutional party status without conceding political ground for the populist anti-Western party.

Some Mahdi radicals can probably already ‘smell’ a sell-out and this would be a victory of sorts for Al-Maliki because it would reduce the scale of the Sadrist political and insurgent threat.

However, it would also mean a significant Sadrist political presence, anti-Western, populist and Islamist, in place, accepted and hungry for reward.

Al-Sadr’s initial response remains, however, defiant: “The Iraqi Government should know that the Mahdi Army will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqi people to to provide all they need from security, stability and independence.”

In short, Sadrism in either its political or military form, is based on a nationalist revolt much like Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland, whether Sinn Fein or IRA.

Al-Sadr then cancelled the major anti-US demonstration in Baghdad on the Fifth Anniversary of the fall of the City (perhaps knowing that violence against his demonstration could be a turning point that would push the country over the edge), while the authorities put a curfew in place.

Meanwhile, Back In The Boondocks ...

The political reaction in the US to Petraeus’ testimony was muted. John McCain had clearly been lined up to argue for staying the course. The criticism that he is the 'continuation of Bushism by other means' seems increasingly correct.

The request for a pause and the risk of US participation in the management of pre-civil war manouevrings in Iraq comes just as Obama and Clinton are shaping up for a brutal fight over the last significant round of Primaries.

The candidates have more to lose than gain by getting embroiled in Iraq with so much ground uncertain. Much of the politics of the issue has degenerated into personal sniping. America, in the round, is as much at sea over Iraq as ever it has been.

We should also note that Al-Maliki is getting a lot of support from the other parties in his Government – not only Sunni but ‘bourgeois’ Shia and closet Baathist – for his tough stand against Al-Sadr. 

Many of these have come to accept occupation as the way things are and see US troops and their allies' cash as tools for use against local enemies.

We should also not underestimate the class dimension to this political battle. The forces of middle class order feel that is perfectly appropriate to call in foreign troops against the mob.

If this happened, they believe, it would be a short sharp violent repression with many lost lives. This is an old, old story of the protection of 'liberty', property and order against the great unwashed and one in which Washington has played a leading role on many occasions.

Iranian Decision-Making

Whatever the American propensity to use armed force to restore middle class values, the Iranians (or some Iranians of a revolutionary bent) are said to be stiffening Sadrist spines and teaching irregular warfare tactics.

This makes the Mahdi Army as uncomfortable for the US as Hezbollah is for the Israelis - these are 'partisans' with some potentially interesting techniques in defeating the will and capability of regular soldiers who cannot deploy the tactics of the SS.

The Iranians almost certainly do not want a violent civil war next door. They would be inclined to support constitutionalism with Lebanese characteristics where they can influence matters through one armed faction. But there is another pressure here. 

They equally do not want a pro-Western Iraq with a massive US air presence hidden away in the desert and capable of turning its historic cities into dust at the flick of a switch. It does not trust America and history suggests that this is a very wise stance to take, 

The US has been releasing its intention to remain embedded in the country using the same base strategy it adopted in Europe in the Cold War. 

Yet the 'leaked' documentation that appeared in the Guardian this week also emphasised that the US intended only to defend and not to attack - is this an indirect message to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Reassurance about long term US intentions in Iraq might shift Iranians off the fence of wanting a stable Iraq, but only if it is dominated by their type of Shia, whether constitutional insiders or those whose power is derived from street movements.

Al-Sadr, no creature of Iran and a nationalist with Islamic characteristics, may represent their one chance to sustain an anti-Western position (albeit that it will not necessarily be any more pro-Iranian in power) that might remove the threat of US armed intervention in Iran from an Iraqi base at some future time of trouble.

It would be no surprise to find Iran playing many sides - talks with the Saudis, dialogue with the US military, manipulation of factions in Baghdad, stiffening of insurgent resistance capability - until it is clear in its own mind what the threat is and how it can be best averted.

If you remember that the US has sustained a nearly thirty year vendetta against the revolution of 1979, has expected a peculiar cowboy justice to be exercised against Iranian 'terrorism' and backed an extremely bloody assault on Iran by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, then Iranian calculations must be that the US is determined to bring down its regime by any means whatsoever.

So, regardless of Al-Maliki’s attempts at state formation and Sadr’s tough decisions about how much fighting he can take before he is crushed by American intervention, the balance of fear inside Tehran of a US or Israeli air strike now or a more massive US-Iraqi threat to its revolutionary settlement later must now be factored in.

The ultimate prize for Iran is the dissolution of American containment policy, whereas the cost for the US is the loss of a key strategic oil state after massive expenditure of blood and money.

Of course, the whole problem might be solved if the US simply accepted the revolutionary settlement of 1979 and stopped bearing grudges - after all, if Nixon could go to China, why not?

But a final word from the Petraeus-Crocker testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. John Warner asked whether all this sacrifice was bringing about a more secure America. Petraeus still refused to be drawn on a fundamentally political question – “ultimately, it can only be assessed by history”, he said.

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