The near-fall of Idriss Deby, President of Chad, seriously frightened Western diplomats. The collapse of his regime could have disrupted a zone extending not only into Darfur but south into the Central African Republic. The deployment of EU troops in Darfur depends on a secure Chadian base.

In addition to the perennial question of oil reserves, Chad is co-operating with the US in the ‘war on terror’ by allowing US troops training facilities and no doubt permitting covert operations and intelligence cover across the Sahel.

The rebels were implicitly backed by Sudan who allegedly backs similar anti-Western forces in the Central African Republic, so that we are seeing the slow, almost sure, creation and extension of a fluid quasi-war front between the 'international community' and the 'resistance', from the Eastern Sahel down to the Somali border. An imploding Kenya does not help matters.

In the event, a Government counter-attack managed to push the rebels back into the desert. Deby and the West got a nasty scare but few expect Deby to fall just yet. He was offered a flight out by the French - the uncharitable might be forgiven for believing that his departure might have been convenient - but he stuck his ground, wisely in the event.

Analysts seem to be betting that the President will become increasingly authoritarian but increasingly necessary to the West, creating yet another uncomfortable ally (insofar as his human rights and democratic record does not exactly glisten in the desert sun) against the growing insurgency.

The West (in this case, France) needs some cover for its increasing entanglement. Some of the cover will come from liberal worries about refugees and the civilian crisis in Darfur, so pressure will increase to do some humanitarian good to justify the presence.

We may expect Deby to come under pressure to restore good governance, human rights and democracy but he has little incentive to do more than the cosmetic in a situation of national emergency in which the West needs Chad as much as dirt-poor Chad needs the West.

What is perhaps more interesting is the way that the United Nations Security Council has been inveigled into giving the French moral cover for any future direct military support for the regime. 

This may be interpreted as another brick in the wall that links the West's policy of military intervention against both 'failed states' and insurgents with the United Nations. This, in turn, makes the UN a target of the insurgents.

We need to step back a moment and ask why France feels it needed to expend political capital on getting a 'cover' Resolution through the UNSC. 

Sarkozy started his Presidency with a claim that he would end the policy of Francafrique, associated with previous Administrations, in which human rights and good governance had come second to supporting pro-French African leaders. Bernard Kouchner, his new Foreign Minister, was also a committed humanitarian with Darfur at the top of his agenda.

How do you square the circle of having 1,800 troops in-country available to support an illiberal African leader, who just happens to be vital to the perceived resolution of the Darfur conflict (the liberal impulse) and to the war on terror, but unable to use them politically in case you are accused of returning to Francafrique?

Why, you make it an action supported by international law? And who decides what is lawful? Why, you do, sort of. France sits on the UNSC with allies prepared to 'do a deal'. And, as Deby looked as if he might go down the tubes, the UNSC made clear its support for the Government with little broader debate on the matter. 

This is another curious intervention by the UN into a country's internal affairs. It is not an admonition against an external invader but a resolution in support of a regime against an internal threat. The UNSC Resolution called on members to provide assistance to the “legal government” in Chad

It is as if the UN, more concerned about global anarchy than great power conflict, is shifting its framework from the defence of sovereign states regardless of their regimes to the defence of regimes so long as they operate against anarchy inside and out.

What precisely is a "legal government" has not been debated. After all, what is so different between the Chadian and Kenyan regime in terms of doubts about the nature of their authority? What criteria are being set as general principles - certainly not commitment to democracy?

The 'internal contradictions' within a system that chooses which regimes to safeguard and yet claims to operate a single law for all must be fairly obvious by now.

The major 'old guard' States [for our recent analysis of the United Nations, go here] are now broadly united in an anti-insurgent/’failed’ states strategy that effectively excludes other states, like Sudan, Burma and Iran, that remain wedded to more traditional interpretations of the original UN Charter.

But there is still no clear legal expression, outside the diktat of the Great Powers, of why some rather than other States are acceptable. 

There is, of course, the Russo-Chinese factor (especially in the light of Russian concerns about Kosovo as precedent and irritation by China at being misled on Iran) and other UNSC members have to brought on board for a Resolution to succeed, but a deal between the US, UK and France in their spheres of influence is not going to be held up by others so long as their own interests are respected. 

In short, the UN is no longer truly independent (if ever it was) nor balanced by blocs but is becoming a mere tool for the policing of the world. It is best that we get used to this.

In this case, having got the UN to give convenient cover, France bit the bullet and indicated yesterday that it would intervene militarily in Chad to support the Deby regime if necessary.

This should be interpreted as a threat to the rebels rather than a sign of imminent action but it would be absurd not to consider this as anything other than a refinement of Francafrique, a quasi-legalistic Westafrique in which France merely positions itself as authorised agent of that strange beast, the 'international community'.

The West is now keen to brief the media that Deby's enemies are no better than Deby (and this may be true), although this is hard to square entirely with their own claims in favour of democracy.

Western 'spin' in Africa should always be regarded with a gentle pinch of salt. For the West, this is about containing Sudan, Islamism, oil or refugee protection but not democracy in the Sahel. This is a hard lesson in ‘realism'. Liberals have to choose between their constitutional and humanitarian imperatives.

French military support for Chad may now have an international legal basis but this legalism equally shows that France is following the Anglo-Saxons in using its power (and ability to negotiate deals) to make the law pretty much as it goes along. 

Most people will see through the manouevre even if they do not care that much - and liberals are learning to be realists in the heat of battle.

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