The Pakistan Election results showed that fears of extensive rigging had been manifestly exaggerated. The PPP and the PML-N both did well. Musharraf’s supporters [PML-Q)] did badly, retaining only 42 seats. Some very serious PML-Q players lost their seats in Parliament.

Turnout was, however, low [45%], which may have been partly a matter of fear at polling station violence and suicide bombing but partly a wider disgust at the shenanigans of the political class and the level of US influence within two of the three main players’ camps. A left-wing nationalist would find little attractive in any of the three parties.

The PPP is usually talked up in the West but, in fact, it got 33% of the seats on the 45% turn-out so it cannot be said to speak for Pakistan much more than any other party.

Together the proposed new coalition between the PPP and PML-N might represent 57% of the National Assembly but this still means that two thirds of the nation either preferred something else, were too scared to vote or just could not bother their backsides to commit to anything.

If anything, the increase in the vote for Sharif’s more national-populist PML-N is more significant than the maintenance of the Bhutto franchise.

The latest news from Pakistan indicates that the PPP and PML-N have agreed in principle to work together to form a government, both in Islamabad and in the Provinces. Such a coalition is still short of the two-thirds of the 442 members of both Houses of Parliament required to impeach the President.

The probability is that the new coalition will not exhaust itself in a fruitless direct attack on the President but will concentrate on reversing his decisions in the run-up to the State of Emergency (and earlier). However, Pakistani political leaders cannot be said to be known for their judgement - anything is possible.

The key development may not be so much between the two opposition parties, necessary though that is, but their joint determination to take up the cause of the judiciary which is implacable in its opposition to Musharraf’s recent methods for the resolution of his political difficulties.

Restoration of the judiciary, especially the reinstatement of Chief Justice Chaudhury, is a central common plank of the new and rather vulnerable coalition but it is still a concession by the PPP to the PML-N. The PPP's price was yet to be made clear at the time of writing.

Other elements in a common programme will be harder to agree. Hearings into the conduct of the Presidential Election and (for the PPP) into a UN investigation into the assassination of Bhutto may well come top of the list.

The PPP also want the restoration of the pre-1999 constitution but many note that the Election has effectively recreated conditions pre-1999 in any case.

Whether the country is going to have to go through the distracting and futile political theatre (well known to Americans) of an impeachment may be as yet unknown but it is clear that Western liberal opinion has fully lost confidence in the President and this is something that the PPP (the pro-Western Party par excellence) may want to play up to. 

The coalition between the PPP and PML-N will be pragmatic and without much love on either side. The two will probably continue to fight like cats in a sack even while both fight Musharraf, so we may be in for an entertaining if unproductive time in Pakistani politics.

The Western liberal view is simple – Musharraf is now part of the problem and not part of the solution and should resign (The Economist, 23 February) ‘with dignity, and some honour’. As we will see, we find this a little too simplistic if Pakistan is to re-stabilise after a difficult period.

The good news, of course, for most citizens is that, when politics get all bitter and hysterical over form rather than policy substance (as we may be about to see), this usually lets the military, business and ordinary folk get on with the job.

The country may drift in policy terms but it is probable that economic development and security policy will be allowed to proceed on the lines broadly set in place by the current President’s team, with or without them.

In the long run, history may be kinder than contemporary opinion in the West and in the country to the President. Yes, he cooked the political books and, yes, he employed some rather curious methods in saving democracy and countering extremism. Yes, he did nothing quite to order from the wise allies in the West.

But posterity may well judge that his judgements were politically wiser in the long run (in the broader Western interest) than anything coming from theoreticians and 'experts' in Washington and London.

We can judge on the final outcome, but things have not turned out so bad: democracy has been preserved and seems vigorous, violence seemed contained, extremists have been isolated and the core economic and security interests of a sovereign state have been maintained. As far as the election was concerned, it is deemed by monitors to have been sufficiently legitimate.

If you go back only six months, there were fears of military dictatorship, provincial revolt and an increase not so much of suicide bombing (which is mere criminality when done by a small minority) but of a wider Islamist insurgency.

Instability was raising serious concerns about the rule of law and the country’s long term economic future.

There was even an ill-considered panic over control of the nuclear trigger - the idea that the Pakistan Army would be giving Islamists free access to nuclear weaponry should now be seen for it was, the fevered politically-driven fantasy of the hardline neo-con security faction within the West.

Much of this instability had nothing to do with Musharraf (though some did) and a lot to do with the West’s clumsy approach to the war on terror and its attempts to interfere in the Pakistani political process.

There has been a lot of talk that Washington staked its future on Musharraf but we think this is far too simple an interpretation. It (and Saudi Arabia) remained loyal to the man for tactical reasons - he was just the eye of the storm.

His handling of the transition to the next stage of democracy was the least worst option at that time. The situation may still be far from perfect and not as originally intended but, from a ‘war on terror’ perspective, things do not look too bad at all (at least compared to only weeks ago).

The biggest losers have been the Islamists who [as the MMA] won a derisory number of seats compared to their 59 at the last election. This is significant because its losses have meant that the Islamists have lost control of North West Frontier Province because they had failed to protect the population from suicide attacks and were, bluntly, poor administrators.

Of course, this suggests that extreme Islamists may get more extreme and the Islamist alliance may become more divided, but they have no popular support (unless the Government blunders). It is hard to see the local Muslims offering, or (in most cases) even wanting, insurgent resistance to sensible police operations by the Pakistan Army.

Some will be criminalized, of course, but many others will learn their lesson and, more like the Turkish Islamists and the growing trend within the Muslim Brotherhood, make themselves internally fit for participation in democratic politics.

This election could also prove to be a pivotal moment in the Afghan War. Pakistan, although still an unstable nation turning in on itself (we are not out of the instability woods by any means), is rejecting Islamism and leaving the Army to do its job alongside its Western allies. If there is a 'screw-up' now, it will be because of Western impatience.

With appropriate changes in strategy within the West, and despite the probable delay to the 2008 Spring Offensive and an increased body count sapping Western will, this may be a turning point in the management of tribal insurgency amongst the Pathans.

We still believe that there will be no alternative to an eventual deal with the 'Taliban', insofar as they are the voice of Pathan nationalism, but radical Islamists are now losing their borderland base because they overplayed their hand. It may only be the US Election that stops the US facing the need for an eventual and inevitable 'deal'.

No puppet of the West, Musharraf's interpretation of the interests of the nation are still closer to those of NATO and the US than most in his country.

Given that security policy is now a negotiation between the PPP and PML-N 'coalition', Kiyani and the Presidency, we can expect the steady integration of the Pakistan war effort with the West but on terms that respect Pakistani sovereign decision-making.  

For the first time in many months, the Western position looks stronger – an undistracted privately sympathetic Pakistan senior military and a self-absorbed but non-Islamist Pakistan make a perfect back-drop to a decisive move to bring the Taliban to heel over the next eighteen months.

Domestically, a weak Presidency may suit everyone. The opposition may rue actually forcing his departure as the only thing that unites them – as they say, be careful what you wish for.

Kiyani may have to be referee on occasions but (in our view) Pakistan is now off the list of threats to the international system for a short while at least – and Musharraf’s ability to survive should not be underestimated.

So, despite the State of Emergency and assassination of Bhutto, and the many unresolved issues and bitterness between the three political factions, democracy, at the end of the day, struggled through.

No province looks as if it is heading for Kosovo status (the biggest fear of military strategists) and there has been no independent political unit emerging outside the existing ‘devil-you-know’ establishment factions. The discontented wider community has no focus to engage in revolution.

None of the three main factions wants a direct confrontation with the West (though the influence of PML-N will ensure a healthy dose of anti-American rhetoric) or to kill the golden goose of economic development. This week, things actually look a little better than they did last week.

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