Is ideology important in recruiting for Al-Qaeda? The Economist points out (based on expert testimony) that the figures that the Press privileges [Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri] are not, in fact, as core to jihadi intellectual discourse as we have been led to believe. While we are not convinced that the detail of ideology drives young males to express their girls, gadgets and guns mentality in political action, ideology and history (and economics) help us to understand which rebellion they will choose over all those on offer. 

Jihadi thinking draws on a very wide range of intellectual resources offering a remarkable degree of coherence, but well within traditional Islamic intellectual methodologies - much as national socialism was highly flexible but fundamentally coherent, using memes derived from traditional Western thought. The Economist's quoted expert [Stephen Ulph of Jamestown] points out that ideology is a critical battleground. We agree.

Our own view remains that jihadism cannot be defeated until the West faces up to its own history of imperialism and colonialism and creates a more credible narrative than its current one, based on both liberalism and denial. The repeated assertion in the West and by pro-Western moderates that jihadi thinking is not ‘true’ Islam is a little fly to say the least - like saying that fascism and communism are not truly Western. Unfortunately, for the proponents for peace and love with whom we have been closely associated in the past, ‘jihadi’ thinking is demonstrably a legitimate strand of Islamic thinking with sources going back to the Mongol invasion [Ibn Tammiyya], long before the Protestant Churches were founded or America discovered by the Europeans. It may be extreme (by recent historical standards) but then so were Luther and Calvin classed as extremist in their time. This did not halt the dynamic in these cases and there is no reason to believe that it will halt the dynamic of jihadism.

The security response to all this is surprisingly weak.  It has no effective ideological challenge of its own that ‘works’ for the marginalized and culturally liminal. The problem is political. The security community's solution comes down to no more than more resources for the hunt and ‘a systematic campaign of counter propaganda … in support of friendly Muslim governments and moderate Muslims’ [The Economist]. But this is defensive and misses the point. The point is that the necessary ‘transvaluation of values’ necessary to defeat insurgency decisively is just not possible within Economist ideology or for unreflective liberal optimism.

Meanwhile, the current security strategy may partially protect the security of the homeland (which may be all that is required) and the political backsides of our Western politicians, but it may make things even more difficult for friendly governments and Muslims – much as the neo-conservative drive for democracy made indigenous Muslim liberals look like agents of a foreign culture instead of champions of global human values. This always was a stupid strategy. It directed America’s inner core values outwards without any adaptation to local conditions. It really does take some talent to alienate Pakistanis to the extent the current US Administration has done!

A better model for dealing with the 'resistance' might have been the slower and essentially realist process of Christianisation in Europe.  The Church appropriated the old traditions and gods and local rulers saw the safety and economic advantages of being part of the Roman community. Or perhaps straight ‘conquest and tolerance’ (if the resources had been there) might have been tried, whereby the economic advantages of being ruled and the costs of not accepting rule were so great that the community policed its own from the bottom up. This 'occupation strategy', similar to that of the Ottomans, is what insurgents believe that we have in place now. However, without greater economic benefits to the masses in terms of stability and trade and an in-built ignorance of alternatives within the system, it is not workable.

All this affects ‘hearts and minds’ policy. A good Press in the West may be so much irrelevant fluff – like Pravda’s reports on increases in aluminium production in the Urals – if local elites are not given the freedom to challenge Western historical dominance while retaining good relations within the West within a globalised economy. The new ‘jihadi’ thinking thrives on a very cogent analysis, in its world, of where power lies and how values are expressions of power – this is the sort of elementary discovery that Gramsci made in his prison cell. Until that truth is faced and the West recognises the internal logic of the challenge, jihadism will grow for a while yet.

[This is the second of three contributions on the 'hearts and minds' debate surrounding jihadism.  The first posting looked at the motivations of the insurgents. The third will look at Al-Qaeda as a wider cultural phenomenon.]